Article 1536 of the Greek Civil Code concerns the modification or revocation of court decisions relating to parental responsibility and child custody. Recently, an amendment introduced through Law 5264/2025 has sparked intense discussion within the legal community and in public discourse.
There are two main interpretative approaches.
The first maintains that, prior to the contested amendment, it was not permissible to file an application for modification against a final (first-instance) judgment while an appeal was pending. In such a case, the application would have been dismissed as inadmissible due to lis pendens, even though Article 1536 refers generally to a “decision,” without specifying whether it must be final or irrevocable.
From this perspective, the new paragraph 2 of Article 1536 seeks to resolve this ambiguity. According to this interpretation, paragraph 1 concerns irrevocable (final and unappealable) decisions, while paragraph 2 expressly introduces an additional possibility: the filing of an application for modification at an earlier stage, namely against a first-instance judgment, even if an appeal is pending.
The second view (illustratively supported by Court of Appeal of Patras decision No. 102/2024) argues that irrevocability was never a prerequisite for submitting an application for modification under Article 1536. From this standpoint, the amendment may be seen as putting an end to the interpretative uncertainty created by the wording of the provision.
However, a further opinion has also been expressed regarding the substance of the new regulation. According to this view, the amendment significantly departs from the pre-existing legal regime and introduces a new and potentially problematic dimension.
In particular, the issue arises whether a change in circumstances remains a necessary condition for the application of the new paragraph.
Paragraph 1 of Article 1536 explicitly requires a substantial change in circumstances as a prerequisite for filing an application to modify a decision regulating child custody matters. By contrast, under the second interpretation, paragraph 2 appears to allow modification even in the absence of such a change.
The text of paragraph 2 does not expressly refer to a change in circumstances as a condition. Moreover, the explanatory memorandum of Law 5264/2025 states that the provision also applies in cases where the original decision “incorrectly assessed the living conditions of the children and their best interests.” This wording suggests that an application for modification may be based not on new factual developments, but on the argument that the court misjudged the existing facts.
In practical terms, this could mean that a party may request modification solely on the grounds of erroneous judicial assessment, even if no substantial circumstances have changed. It cannot therefore be excluded that the provision may be applied without invoking any change in circumstances. In any event, every application for modification must be grounded in the best interests of the child, which remain the fundamental and non-negotiable principle of the legal framework.
